ROUSSEAU'S PHILOSOPHY (OR PHILOSOPHIES?) OF EDUCATION

Peter M Collins*
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

The complexity of Jean Jacques Rousseau becomes evident in the severe contrast within his views upon education. One of the central issues raised in his educational theory is the relationship between education for individuality and education for citizenship. Part of the foundation of this question lies quite obviously in social and political philosophy, more specifically, in matters pertaining to man and the state. In this paper Rousseau's theory of education is investigated with specific attention to his interest in forming the individual and the citizen. Some of the apparent contradictions are traced to their philosophical roots (in Rousseau's own writings). The attempt to answer the question of whether Rousseau is propounding two distinct philosophies of education, or whether he did reconcile them appears to clarify somewhat the thrust of his thought in these matters. It also provides a partial explanation for the tremendous influence he has exerted on the modern mind. Rousseau addressed himself to a perennial philosophical-educational question. Even though he himself may not have provided a completely satisfactory response, his clarification of the difficulty, as well as his efforts to resolve it, apparently are still felt today.

Someone not familiar with the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau scarcely would be inclined to accept the fact that the following pairs of assertions concerning education flowed from the pen of the same person, particularly when read in their original context.

**Purposes**
(a) *Emile* The purpose of education is to assist the boy to develop in accord with nature, to learn to live so as to attain manhood (15, pp 14-15)
(b) *Minor Writings* Education should produce citizens who are patriotic by inclination as well as by necessity (16, p 97)

**Agencies**
(a) *Emile* There are three educators — nature, men and things. They must lead to a common goal. Nature is the most fundamental educator and its goal is the goal of education because it (nature) is independent of us and cannot be modified (15, pp 11-12)
(b) *Minor Writings* Public education, as prescribed by the government and directed by government-appointed officials, is one of the basic requirements of popular government and the most important responsibility of the state (16, pp 41-42).

* Requests for off-prints should be sent to Peter M Collins, School of Education, Marquette University, 502 North Fifteenth Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233.
Curriculum (a) Emile Until the age of reason (about age thirteen), the child will do right, not by following the prescriptions of persons, but by living in accord with nature. His present interests must dominate the educational scene (15, pp 40, 52) (b) Minor Writings. The form and the order of the child's studies should be determined by law (16, p 98).

Methods (a) Emile The education of the young child should be purely negative. It should consist not in the inculcation of virtue and truth, but in protecting the heart from vice and the mind from error. It should keep the mind inactive as long as possible while exercising the body and the senses, and it should avoid verbal lessons in favour of experience. In order to let childhood ripen, experience and feeling should emerge as the real teachers (15, pp 40-42) (b) Minor Writings. In order to promote patriotism, the virtues of courage and justice should be preached and taught by famous warriors and upright judges (16, p 42).

Authority (a) Emile The child should act not out of obedience, but only from necessity, he should not be given any orders nor allowed even to imagine the legitimacy of human authority (15, pp 37-39) (b) Minor Writings. Instruction without authority and example is fruitless (16, p 42).

Discipline (a) Emile Children should be left free to develop themselves in a suitable atmosphere. This is founded on the principle that the natural inclinations are always right, that the human heart harbours no original perversity (15, pp 16, 40, 42) (b) Minor Writings. Children must be accustomed to discipline from an early age (16, p 99).

Social orientation (a) Emile Although the boy, at the age of fifteen, is familiar with the relationships between man and things, he neither knows nor cares about the relationships between man and man. The importance of this is seen in that civilized man is a slave (15, pp 15, 93) (b) Minor Writings. Children should be made to play together in public, moved to rivalry and emulation in seeking a common end. From an early age they should become accustomed to equality and fraternity, and to living under the public eye and seeking public approbation. They should learn to desire only what the community wants and to become the defenders of the country (16, pp 41-42, 99).

How seriously opposed are these aspects of educational theory, one tending to support direct education for individualism, the other direct education for citizenship? Can they be reconciled? Has Rousseau reconciled
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them? Does he provide philosophical bases for each? If so, do these philosophical principles form a consistent pattern? Or, has Rousseau formulated two distinct philosophies of education? Finally, what has this eighteenth-century French philosopher contributed to the 'modern mind'? These and related questions will be considered in an attempt to better understand the philosophy and educational theory of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and possibly some philosophical and educational alternatives confronted today.

EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUALISM

Since Rousseau's *Emile* has been thoroughly analyzed by various commentators, only a brief summary and elaboration of selected principles will be provided. An attempt will be made to ascertain the relationship between these educational ideals and pertinent philosophical principles.

*Educational theory*

To understand Rousseau's view of education in *Emile* means to comprehend 'negative education,' as he uses the term. Fundamental to that notion are his assertions that it is much more important to exclude vice and error from the child's life than to inculcate virtue and truth, and that the essential thing is to make the young child a good healthy animal, especially by allowing him as much freedom as possible. According to Rousseau, education ought to consist less in precept than in practice, with attempts to develop reason occurring much later than was the ordinary custom. In fact, he claims that the educator should 'do the opposite of what is usually done and you will almost always be right (15, p. 41)'.

This kind of education is child-centered; the process of education is to be focused upon the conscious needs of the child. This basic concept, however, must be understood in light of Rousseau's view of the stages of development (corresponding to the five 'books' of *Emile*): infancy (ages 0-5), boyhood (6-12), the approach of adolescence (13-15), adolescence (16-20), and marriage.

The child at each of these various stages has very different characteristics than he has at other stages, Rousseau maintains. Two examples will illustrate this important point. One is the principle of the 'intrinsic worth of the child', this concept is related to, but distinct from, the principle of the goodness of the child at birth. It signifies that the child is not a miniature adult, but a being with characteristics somewhat unique to children, a
being of inherent worth and dignity for what he is now, not only for what he will become later (15, pp 5-6) The author of *Emile* explains that 'childhood has its place in the scheme of human life. We must view the man as a man, and the child as a child (15, p 34)' One practical reason he adduces to support this contention is that children may not live to attain manhood and so will have prepared unnecessarily for that state and will have lost what happiness they could have experienced as children (15, p 33) For educational theory this demands that the goals of education be formulated in terms of the present, not the future Paradoxically, one prepares for the future by refusing to look at the future, since one becomes a mature adult by living through each stage of his development For educational practice this means that the methods of educating adults are not those employed with children (15, p 118)

A second example supporting Rousseau's view that students differ radically at various stages concerns the development of reason (at about age thirteen) What constitutes the function called reasoning? Rousseau contrasts sensation, which produces images, and reason, which produces ideas Two differences appear Firstly, sensing is a purely passive process, and reasoning is an active one, and secondly, images are 'exact pictures of sense-given objects (15, p 46),' while ideas are 'notions of the objects determined by their relations (15, p 46)' In other words, sensing is a passive process of 'seeing' individual sense objects, reasoning is an active process of comparing those sense images (15, pp 46-47) This enables Rousseau to define an idea as 'a sort of mixed or complex sensation (15, p 91)' The awakening of reason coincides with the initiation of Emile's reading Although Rousseau tends to deny or diminish the significance of books (15, pp 72-73, 83) he does give Emile a copy of *Robinson Crusoe* (and later other books) in light of the fact that he can now reason The promotion of reading does not appear to be an exception to his persistency in attributing a certain priority to sense awareness (15)

At this point we will forego a systematic elaboration of the chronological development of Emile in order to pursue an analysis of four topics regarding Rousseau's direct education for individualism as expressed in *Emile* References are made to these four considerations (aims of education, educational agencies, curriculum and methods and teacher-student relationship) in the contrasts portrayed in the introduction to these remarks, as a result, this description will be relatively brief

In *Emile* we find that the primary aim of education is to develop a man (15, p 14) Rousseau has no intention of directly preparing his young
pupil for a particular kind of work, rather, by preparing him for manhood alone, he will necessarily be enabling him to undertake fruitfully the duties of a particular vocation (15, p 13)

That is not the whole answer to the question of educational aims, of course. Perhaps even a more fundamental goal is happiness, that is, to live well (which demands becoming a man). Furthermore, there are definite means to these ends, which means can be taken as ends, in a sense. To become a man, one must live in accord with nature, to be accomplished through conforming one’s life to one’s ‘original inclinations (15, pp 11-12).’ These inclinations are sought by means of the cultivation of one’s senses and feelings (only the senses and feelings prior to approximately age thirteen, primarily the senses and feelings after the onset of ‘reason’). A very significant path to this intermediate goal is the provision of freedom, enabling the child to do as he desires (within certain limits).

Therefore, the aims of Rousseau’s education for individualism include, in order of immediacy, the following: to provide an atmosphere of freedom, to assist in the cultivation of the senses and feelings, to facilitate living in accord with nature, to enable the realization of manhood, and to enhance the possibility of happiness in life. The last of these goals entails sociability as well as individuality, which raises one of the central questions in these considerations.

The second topic, concerning the agencies of education, is integral to the actualization of educational goals. According to Rousseau in *Emile*, there are three educators — nature, men, and things. The education of nature, men, and things are identified, respectively, with the ‘internal development of faculties and organs,’ the ‘use we learn to make of this development,’ and that which ‘comes to us from our experience of the things that affect us (15, p 11).’ Human persons can control the first of these three not at all (or nearly so), the third to a limited extent, and only the second significantly (although that is doubtful) (15, p 12). The foremost educator is nature — for two reasons: firstly, the goal of education is nature’s own goal, and secondly, only nature, among the three, is not able to be modified, which makes it the basis for determining the direction of the other two. Among men who educate, the father is the natural tutor of his sons (15, pp 18-19).

The curriculum is the third of these considerations in Rousseau’s education for individuality (15). What should be taught the young boy...
obviously varies somewhat as he grows older, however, there are some underlying principles, one of which is the centring of what is learned upon the conscious needs of the individual. This is the basis for a second principle the necessary indefiniteness (within limits) of the contents of one's education. Because the foundation of education is the student's experiences and feelings in the particular situation, the educator hesitates to predefine what is to be learned. In light of the latter's awareness of developmental psychology and the needs of this particular individual, he must help the student meet situations as they unfold. As a result, the kind of knowledge most important for the teacher is knowledge of the child (and his environment).

Until the activation of the boy's ability to judge (or reason), the only object of awareness is that which can be sensed or experienced through the feelings. The child is put into contact with the natural environment, not books. After he begins to reason (about age thirteen), he is exposed to books and (eventually) such studies as art, history, literature, social science, and religion. However, at all times the priority of sensation and feeling must be borne in mind. Thus, along with the student-centredness and the relative indefiniteness of the curriculum, is all-important.

The fourth and final educational concern in this category, teaching methodology and teacher-student relationships, overlaps some of the above commentary (15). Probably the most obvious method employed is the exposure of the child to the natural environment, planned in a manner conducive to his discovery of nature in accord with his own interests and capabilities. As experience is gained in this manner, and as the child matures physically and mentally, he is confronted with words in the form of books and discussion with the tutor.

Regarding the sub-topic of authority and discipline, the picture has been clarified in our discussion of goals or aims. The child is to be permitted to follow his natural instincts and feelings. Freedom is a key in the process of human formation. However, the tutor is not completely permissive — he is a guide who manipulates the environment in such a way as to invite the free response of the growing individual. This environment, of course, for many years is isolated from society, only during adolescence (16 to 20 years of age) do the social sentiments develop and provoke relationships with one's peers.

One additional comment is in order: the educational principles discussed above appertain to a boy, not a girl. Because Sophie differs from Emile in
her passivity and weaker intelligence, she is to be introduced to society at an early age and taught authoritatively. She is to please Emile after they meet and marry.

The reader must keep in mind that these remarks were not intended to analyze exhaustively and in chronological order the education of Emile. An effort was made only to summarize some of the central principles in Rousseau's education for individualism to facilitate later a comparison with principles regarding education for citizenship. Before turning to the latter, we must seek out some philosophical principles pertinent to *Emile*.

**Philosophical principles**

A few directly relevant philosophical principles (some of which have been discussed) are found in *Emile*, others regarding the natural man and the civilized man are analyzed by Rousseau in the two early essays, 'Discourse on the Arts and Sciences' (1750), and 'Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Men' (1758). These topics and sources, along with a discussion of some Rousseauian views on the role of feeling, form the basis for an attempt to locate some philosophical foundations of education for individualism according to Rousseau.

Although *Emile* is a treatise in education and is not a major source of Rousseau's philosophy, it is not devoid of philosophical principles. For example, one can consult its initial sentence: 'Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the Maker of the world but degenerates once it gets into the hands of man (15, p 11)' 'Everything,' of course, includes the child, who is born good ('state of nature') and is corrupted in society ('state of civilization'). This principle is distinct, although not separable, from the notion of the intrinsic worth of the child, as indicated above. The point of the former is the complete goodness of the child and all his inclinations, the burden of the latter is the fact that the child is not a miniature adult, but a being of worth and dignity in his own right — this, in itself, does require some goodness, of course.

A third philosophical principle in *Emile* concerns the meaning of 'to know.' The connotations of 'reason,' 'reasoning,' and 'judgment' are highly significant for Emile's education. (This, too, has been the object of some discussion above, and more will be said in analyzing the Discourses.) Fourthly, the principle of utility is proposed in the famed educational writing. Although it is explained only in the context of the process of education, the view is that man should act on the basis of that which is useful to him here and now (15, p 81).
Finally, the priority of feelings over reason is foreshadowed in *Emile*, again in the context of ‘raising up a man’. In the development of the child, feeling definitely assumes chronological precedence (15, p 21) Even older and more mature persons should give careful attention to their feelings, according to Rousseau (15, p 127) He provides the following reasons: natural law is not ascertained by reason alone, but the real teachers are experience and feeling (15, pp 81, 105), natural right must be based on natural needs of the human heart (15, p 105), and the passions are the primary instruments for human preservation (15, p 97) The specific nature and kinds of feelings, and their relationship to reason will be elaborated below.

These five principles are closely related to Rousseau’s principles on man, knowledge and society expressed in the two early discourses. The first, Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (18) was published in response to an essay contest sponsored by the Academy of Dijon. Rousseau describes the manner in which he became aware of this contest and his own immediate reaction:

I was on my way to see Diderot, then a prisoner at Vincennes. I had a copy of the *Mercure de France* in my pocket and I took to leafing through it along the way. My eyes lit on the question of the Academy of Dijon which occasioned my first piece of writing. If anything was ever like a sudden inspiration it was the impulse that surged up in me as I read that. Suddenly I felt my mind dazzled by a thousand lights, crowds of lively ideas presented themselves at once, with a force and confusion that threw me into an inexpressible trouble, I felt my head seized with a vertigo like that of intoxication. A violent palpitation oppressed me, made me gasp for breath, and being unable any longer to breathe as I walked, I let myself drop under one of the trees of the wayside, and there I spent half an hour in such a state of agitation that when I got up I perceived the whole front of my vest moistened with my own tears which I had shed unawares. Oh, Sir, if ever I could have written even the quarter of what I saw and felt under that tree, with what dandy should I have revealed all the contradictions of the social system, with what force would I have exposed all the abuses of our institutions, in what simple terms would I have demonstrated that man is naturally good, and that it is through these institutions alone that men become bad.

The essay won for its author the first prize and instant fame (2)

* Cited from a letter to M De Malesherbes, Montmorency, January 12, 1762, in Rousseau (11) This letter is no 1249 in Rousseau (10) Cf also 3, 19.
The conclusion of Rousseau's immediate response, just cited, provides the theme for the *First Discourse* (18). His mission was the criticism of civilization, the reason for this becomes evident with an awareness of the goodness and happiness of the 'natural man.' But what is this kind of man? One of his fundamental characteristics is a consistency of inner feelings and desires, and external appearances — human authenticity. Rousseau decries the affectations and superficialities of 'civilized man.' Social rules and customs, rather than inclinations, seem to prompt human actions, resulting in the inevitable proliferation of such vices as insincerity, suspicions, fears, coldness, reserve, and betrayal, all of which are hidden under the veil of politeness and urbanity. Only the semblance of virtue remains (18, pp 36-38).

What brought about this corruption, which has been accompanied by the dissolution of man's goodness and happiness? How has he effected his own degradation? Rousseau gives various examples which link the cultivation of the arts and sciences with the disintegration of morals and subsequent slavery and unhappiness (18, pp 40-42, 50-53). He leaves no doubt regarding his opinion of the source of these ills: our souls have been corrupted in proportion to the advancement of our sciences and arts toward perfection (18, p 39). The arts and sciences have arisen from vice and cultivate vice, causing society irreparable loss of time (18, pp 48-49).

The wider background for incipient social evils is civilization itself, insofar as it has provided the luxury which enables men to pursue knowledge (18, pp 46, 54). Therefore, civilization has provided luxury, which has promoted the development of the arts and sciences, which has stimulated a false sophistication and artificiality among human beings, which is directly associated with corruption of taste and morals, which invites slavery and unhappiness. The end result is the de-humanization of man.

Rousseau's intent in the *First Discourse,* to establish the prominent role of the arts and sciences in the dissolution of morals and human happiness, is logically related to the priority of feeling over reason, mentioned briefly above. True philosophy, the path to real happiness, consists in communing with oneself and listening to the voice of one's conscience in the silence of his passions because the principles of the good life are engraved in all hearts (18, p 64).

Undaunted by opposition to his first essay, Rousseau decided to compete for another prize offered by the Dijon Academy, the question to be
confronted this time was, 'What is the origin of inequality among men, and is it authorized by natural law? (17, p 99)' Although not a prize winner, the Second Discourse was published in 1758. The purpose of the writer was to comprehend the 'meaning of man,' for the source of inequality cannot be known unless one first understands human beings (17, p 91). The attainment of that knowledge must be sought, according to Rousseau, by attempting to ascertain the difference between man's original attributes and his acquired artificialities (17, pp 92-93). This helps to explain why the Second Discourse is devoted to an elaborate account of how man has passed from the 'state of nature' to the 'state of civilization.'

The author formulates one of the central questions as follows:

And how will man manage to see himself as nature formed him, through all the changes that the sequence of time and things must have produced in his original constitution, and to separate what he gets from his own stock from what circumstances and his progress have added to or changed in his primitive state? (17, p 91)

In order to gain awareness of the natural man, we must know correctly a state which no longer exists, which perhaps never existed, which probably never will exist (17, p 93). By what means might that project be undertaken?

In an effort to know the natural man, one must distinguish between historical truths, on one hand, and 'hypothetical and conditional reasonings' on the other (17, p 103). In other words, the search is not for the true origin of man, but his original nature, which appears to demand an analysis of the most fundamental operations of the human soul (17, p 95). Such a study cannot be descriptive, but must be philosophical (17, pp 95, 102). It is undertaken by means of natural reason, independently of religious dogmas (17, pp 97, 103, 180)

What, then, is man in the state of nature? In the 'Preface' Rousseau detects two 'pre-rational' principles (17, p 95) — an interest in one's self-preservation and well-being, and a compassion for others — both intelligible independently of man's sociability. In the body of the essay, first the physical aspect and then the metaphysical and moral dimension of the natural man are surveyed. Regarding the former, we find extensive similarities between man and brute. Living amidst the wild animals, men would develop strong and agile bodies, able to subsist by means of skill if not strength (17, pp 105-106).
Prescinding from the purely physical realm of man's being, one finds three differences between man and brute. One of them is a merely quantitative distinction — that concerning understanding.

Every animal has ideas, since it has senses, it even combines its ideas up to a certain point, and in this regard man differs from a beast only in degree. Some philosophers have even suggested that there is more difference between a given man and another than between a given man and a given beast (17, p 114).

The second characteristic of man — namely, his freedom — distinguishes him from animal in a more basic way. Comparing animal and man on this point, Rousseau claims that the former chooses by means of instinct and the latter through an act of freedom (17, p 113). In elaborating this, he asserts a non-materialistic doctrine of man.

Nature commands every animal, and the beast obeys. Man feels the same impetus, but he realizes that he is free to acquiesce or resist, and it is above all in the consciousness of this freedom that the spirituality of his soul is shown. For physics explains in some way the mechanism of the senses and the formation of ideas, but in the power of willing, or rather of choosing, and in the sentiment of this power are found only purely spiritual acts about which the laws of mechanics explain nothing (17, p 114).

A third difference between man and brute animal lies in man's faculty of self-perfection. This faculty, with the aid of circumstances, bears the burden of developing all the others, it pertains to the species as well as the individual. By contrast an animal becomes in the first few months what it will be all its life, furthermore, its species remains fundamentally unchanged (at least over long periods of time) (17, pp 114-115).

Instinct alone suffices for living in the state of nature, cultivated reason is necessary only to live in society (17, pp 127-128). Because of his unenlightened condition, the physical needs of the natural man coincide with his desires. 'Good' is found in nourishment, a female, and sleep. 'Evil' is specified as pain and hunger (17, p 116). In other words, virtues and vices are to be understood in the physical sense, the former associated with that which contributes to preservation of self, and the latter with that which hampers it (17, p 128). The natural man is preoccupied only with his present existence and is not given to worrying about the future (17, p 117).
Rousseau says, presuming we are destined to be healthy, 'I almost dare affirm that the state of reflection is a state contrary to nature and that the man who meditates is a depraved animal (17, p. 110).'

The author of the Second Discourse distinguishes, in the sentiment of love, between the moral and the physical, the latter being a general desire of one sex to unite with the other (17, p. 134), and the former designating that which determines the desire and directs it exclusively toward one particular object, or which at least provides a greater degree of energy for the preferred object. The natural man is limited to physical love, in that so-called moral love is founded on certain notions of merit and beauty and on comparisons incomprehensible to the savage (17, pp 134-135).

The general status of the man in nature is summed up by Rousseau himself:

Let us conclude that wandering in the forests, without industry, without speech, without domicile, without war and without liaisons, with no need of his fellow-man, likewise with no desire to harm them, perhaps never even recognizing anyone individually, savage man, subject to few passions and self-sufficient, had only the sentiments and intellect suited to that state, he felt only his true needs, saw only what he believed he had an interest to see, and his intelligence made no more progress than his vanity. If by chance he made some discovery he was all the less able to communicate it because he did not recognize even his children. Art perished with the inventor. There was neither education nor progress, the generations multiplied uselessly, and everyone always starting from the same point, centuries passed in all the crudeness of the first ages, the species was already old, and man remained ever a child (17, p 137).

Finding inequality to be hardly perceptible in the state of nature (17, p. 140), the author sets out to show how inequality originates and develops. In moving from this original state to the development of inequality, he describes a key principle: servitude develops from the dependence of man upon man. Thus, the origin of man's bondage seems to lie in the social situation itself. The immediate founder of civil society was the first person to appropriate property effectively (17, p 141). The idea of private property, of course, depended upon a succession of prior ideas, especially that of the interrelationship of a man with other beings, the development of language and mind, and the establishment and differentiation of families (17, pp 143-148).
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The enlargement of reason and arousal of vanity gave rise to competition and rivalry, opposition of interest, and the hidden desire to profit at the expense of others, gradually, there grew demands of civility, laws to protect that civility, and punishment to enforce the laws (17, pp 150-160) Inequality, slavery, and misery soon accompanied these changes (17, pp 151-152) Along the same line, the author attributes to these phenomena the organization of society, entailing the subjection of the human race to a few ambitious individuals (17, p 160)

The progress of inequality is succinctly summarized in three stages the establishment of law and the right of property, authorizing the status of rich and poor, the institution of the magistracy, promoting the division of strong and weak, and the changing of legitimate power into arbitrary power, resulting in the classes of master and slave Thus third epoch marks 'the last degree of inequality and the limit to which all others finally lead, until new revolutions dissolve the government altogether or bring it closer to its legitimate institution (17, p 172),' (cf also pp 177-178)

In two brief passages, Rousseau summarizes and concludes the Second Discourse The first contrasts the natural man and civilized man

A final statement closes his essay

It follows from this exposition that inequality, being almost null in the state of nature, draws its force and growth from the development of our faculties and the progress of the human mind, and finally becomes stable
and legitimate by the establishment of property and laws. It follows, further, that moral inequality, authorized by positive right alone, is contrary to natural right whenever it is not combined in the same proportion with physical inequality a distinction which sufficiently determines what one ought to think in this regard of the sort of inequality that reigns among all civilized people, since it is manifestly against the law of nature, in whatever manner it is defined, that a child command an old man, an imbecile lead a wise man, and a handful of men be glutted with superfluities while the starving multitude lacks necessities (17, pp 180-181).

The last distinct topic in the consideration of Rousseau's philosophical principles underlying his education for individualism is the nature of feeling and its relationship to reason. It will be analyzed very briefly since it has been discussed above.

Rousseau persistently maintained that the most fundamental impulse in man is self-love (15, p 97), an innate desire to preserve and enhance the self (15, pp 40, 44). It is the only in-born passion and is the source of all others, which are (in a sense) only modifications of it (15, p 97). The feeling or impulse of self-love is not to be confused with egoism. The latter is a feeling of preference of oneself over others, which arises only in society, the natural man did not make comparisons (8, p 197, cf. also 6, pp 174, 184, 15, pp 97, 102).

A second feeling significant in human development is compassion, a pre-reflective emotion of nature which comes into play when man takes note in some sense of his fellow human beings. It moderates love of self in individuals, contributes to the preservation of the species, and, in the state of nature, takes the place of laws, morals, and virtues. Although distinct from self-love, compassion is a derivative of it, it is simply an extension of the concern for self to a concern for others, partially as a result of seeing the needs of others as similar to one's own demands (6, pp 174-184, 15, pp 97, 102, 17, pp 131-133).

The verb 'to feel' is sometimes assumed by Rousseau to signify the immediate apprehension or intuition of the good, as in his statement, 'What I feel to be right is right, what I feel to be wrong is wrong' (6, p. 249).

*This point is found in its entirety in Foxley's translation of *Emile* (6).
Closely related to the last signification of feeling is the relationship between feelings, morality, and conscience. According to Rousseau, morality is not only founded on one's natural feelings but is precisely the unhindered development of man's natural feelings (2, pp 93-94, 6, pp 61, 173, 215, 15, pp 44, 97, 113). This presumes, of course, that man’s natural desires and impulses are totally good, rendering the impediment of his natural drives an evil. Conscience is an innate principle of justice and virtue, residing in the heart, by which one determines his own actions or those of others to be good or evil (6, p 252). It appears that feelings are the basis of morality by the very definition of morality. All morality is not merely based upon feeling, but, perhaps more accurately, is identified with the development of feeling. The ultimate basis is, of course, self-love, because that is the original and most fundamental impulse and the source of all others.

What is the relationship between feeling and reason in regard to morality, according to Rousseau? Unquestionably, the emphasis is upon feeling as a guide to living; however, there is some role reserved for reason. Feeling is innate, while intelligence develops later. He seems to indicate that the function of the latter is to awaken the feelings, which are the impeccable guides to good. Therefore, feeling enjoys a double priority over reason—chronological (because it arises first) and substantial (because it is more fundamental) (6, p 253).

One commentator claims that the doctrine of the priority of feelings over reason constitutes a major contribution of Rousseau to the ‘making of the modern mind’ (5). In reacting against an and rationalism (2, p 96), Rousseau apparently became unique in the history of ideas for his appeal to feeling. The two following comments bear this out:

To feel — that is the thing with Rousseau, and that is the heritage he bequeathed to the world. The English moral sentimentalists had reasoned about a moral sense and about feeling, they had by rational criticism shown that reason was not everything. Rousseau is different. He is all feeling. He peels off man’s skin to leave his nerves raw. Reason is vicious, but feeling is good, thinking is antihuman, but impulses are ‘natural’. ‘Let us lay it down as an incontrovertible rule,’ he insists, ‘that the first impulses of nature are always right; there is no original sin in the human heart.’ Rousseau appealed to feeling as no one before him had done, and that is why Morley sums this point up by observing that ‘this was not merely a new doctrine, it was a battle cry.’
Rousseau creates his new morality on feeling, and for this reason he is termed by Kant the 'Newton of the moral order.' His morality is fresh, indeed, but it is built on the shifting foundation of impulsive feeling, so that right and wrong change as rapidly with him as does his impulse. Right and wrong, after Rousseau, are more closely connected with good or bad digestion than ever before in history. Objective right and wrong give way to your emotional impulses. What you feel is right, according to Rousseau, is right simply because you feel it is so (5, p 191).

**Philosophy of and education**

The first consideration regarding Rousseau's education for individualism is the relationship between the philosophical and educational principles already discussed. One can proceed from the philosophy to the education or vice versa. We will follow the former pattern, and, in doing so, attempt first to identify each philosophical principle and then immediately its educational consequent(s). The principles will be explicated only to the extent necessary to clarify the pertinent relationship(s).

First, the total goodness of the child at birth (therefore, in another sense, in the state of nature) supports a central feature of Rousseau's 'negative education,' namely, the freedom and flexibility accompanying child-centredness. The child is not only allowed, but also prompted (within limits), to pursue the fulfillment of his desires in the natural environment. Since all his instincts are good in themselves, what he chooses on the basis of them will inevitably prove beneficial. This can be tested by assuming an opposed view of man if the child is fundamentally depraved, strict and rigid codes of behavior must be devised, and he must be coerced through verbalization and physical punishment to observe them in order to root out and overcome the evil tendencies and attain the good.

Secondly, the intrinsic worth of the child as a child, that is, the fact that he is a being of worth and dignity in himself, not merely in his potential for becoming an adult, affects the purposes and methodology of education. Because of the child's uniqueness and worth as a child, the goals of education must concern primarily the present, not the future. In fact, because the child must be developed in each stage of his existence as a preparation for the next level, one prepares for the future by disregarding the future in favor of attention to the present. Furthermore, this view of the child demands an alteration of curriculum and methods to suit each stage. This will be elaborated immediately below in regard to knowledge, which varies significantly for child and adult.
Thirdly, the meaning of 'to know' hinges upon the meaning of 'reason' and the capability of one's reasoning powers. As already clarified, until about age thirteen the child is able only to sense and, thus, to form images, with the development of reason, he is able to compare sense images to form ideas. Therefore, in his early years he will be restricted exclusively to learning through sensible objects. The role of the teacher will be to provide an environment of things appropriate to his interests and maturation. When he becomes capable of reasoning, he gains an interest in reading and listening, perhaps in order to compare his own observations with those of others. As a result, he is provided with books (books giving an account of experiences similar to his own — so, Robinson Crusoe first), and he also is enlightened through conversation with his tutor. These obvious changes bear a relationship to further curricular innovations, such as the teaching of history, literature, and religion, as he matures.

Fourthly, the priority of feelings over reason, so clearly an essential feature of Rousseau's philosophy, is not unrelated to the meaning one attaches to the relativity of truth. His view explains, in some measure, the need for a child-centred education with its flexible curriculum. Because of the flux of emotional states, the educator must be preoccupied primarily and constantly with the child in order to ascertain his (the child's) desires. The curriculum, what the child learns, will vary with his desires, which may change rather frequently and radically. A concern for an objective truth comprehended through reason and ordered in a somewhat pre-defined curriculum holds a secondary place, if any. Presuming that the curriculum is a version of the truth adapted to the abilities of the learner, the truth viewed as constantly changing means seeing the curriculum in the same manner.

Fifthly, man has a free will — at least in the state of nature. He is able to choose and become responsible for his destiny. This justifies the freedom provided by the educator in an effort to promote the child to become himself, an authentic human being. The spiritualistic, non-mechanistic and non-deterministic dimension of man is linked with his free will and is promoted in education as just described.

Sixthly, and closely related to the last point, the natural man possesses a faculty of self-protection. This, too supports the child-centredness and concomitant freedom in education mentioned above. Along with the innate goodness of man in the state of nature, it provides a basis for freedom in that the child will do instinctively not only what is good for himself, but
that which renders him an even better person

The principle of utility is the seventh consideration. The criterion put forth for behaviour, namely, usefulness or satisfaction of present needs, becomes an underlying criterion for the curriculum. Linked to the previous philosophical principles, it contributes to the substantiation of the child-centred negative education already described.

The eighth principle, the identification of morality with the development of one’s feelings (especially self-love), means for moral education, or education for character, the untrammeled cultivation of one’s instincts, and that demands, again, the freedom of a child-centred educational process.

Ninthly, the corruption of man through socialization, which entails private property and the arts and sciences, dictates an early childhood education away from society. This does not necessarily mean complete and continuous dissociation from one’s peers. In fact, another side of this philosophical principle appears to be the social nature of man. In Emile the social instinct did develop, and, in time he found himself in a well known social institution — marriage. Perhaps, then, the child is kept away from society only in order to become a better citizen. But this touches upon one of the central issues of *Emile* — how will a man who has been educated exclusively for himself get along with other people (15, p 14)? — and one of the major questions of this paper — can Rousseau’s theories of education for individualism and education for citizenship and their respective underlying philosophies be reconciled?

Finally, the differences between male and female, Rousseau-style, account for very different kinds of education for each. As noted, Sophie is less aggressive and less intelligent than Emile. In Book V (the last chapter) of *Emile*, the education of Sophie is described — she is placed in a domestic situation and taught the duties of the home and the art of pleasing in a manner appropriate to her docility. She is to distinguish good and evil on the basis of what she is told to do. That which is commanded is good, that which is forbidden is evil (15, pp 146-147). She should assume her mother’s religion, and later her husband’s (15, p 144).

In conclusion, it is important to note that some of these philosophical principles might well support educational tenets other than those depicted. Furthermore, some of these educational theories might find partial justification in philosophical doctrines not presented here. Nevertheless, the
principles elucidated are circumscribed within the spirit and teaching of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and there is a bond or consistency between the philosophy and the education. His education for individualism does find some philosophical substantiation in his own doctrines.

EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP

This side of Rousseau's educational theory also will be summarized briefly in light of the principles clarified at the outset. An effort will be made to search out some philosophical principles pertinent to education for citizenship as described by Rousseau in his so-called 'minor educational writings.' Again, an effort will be made to correlate the education and the philosophy.

Educational theory

The same four topics followed in analyzing education for individuality will be used here — they are aims or goals of education, educational agencies, curriculum, and methods of teaching and teacher-student relationship.

The primary aim of education, according to Rousseau in 'Considerations on the Government of Poland and on the Reformation of It Projected in April, 1772,' is clearly nationalistic — it is to form patriotic citizens (13, p 97). Other goals are explicitly or implicitly included as means to the formation of loyal countrymen. For example, educators attempt to acquaint students with the heritage of their forefathers, that is, with the values and ideals which inspired them (14, p 42). Thirdly, an objective closely related to this one is to familiarize students with current conditions in and facts about their country, especially its laws (13, p 99, 14, pp 41-42). Fourthly, students should be subjected to rules and regulations at an early age so as to inculcate a respect for authority (13, p 92, 14, p 42). Rousseau explicitly stated another goal — to promote socialization at an early age in order to foster a spirit of equality and fraternity (13, p 99, 14, p 41-42). Finally, another specific objective of the educational process is to motivate, particularly through personal example, the kind of behavior which best will promote the interests of the country (14, p 42).

Whereas the education of the individual, as such, requires the 'cooperation' of three educational agents (man, nature, and things), the direct formation of a citizen is accomplished primarily through the state (13, p 98, 14, pp 41-42). In the principles from the 'minor writings' introducing these remarks, the role of the parents is not emphasized, however, Rousseau does
leave open the possibility of domestic education, at least within limitations (13, p 99) At any rate, this education is unquestionably the most important responsibility of the state (14, p 42), and the curriculum should be determined by law (13, p 98) He refers explicitly to mother, father, and children in one passage, but the first is a simile for 'homeland,' and the last two must be understood in the context of patriotism — fathers and sons of the nation (14, pp 41-42)

The curriculum, as just indicated, must be formulated and ordered by the state (13, p 98) The content (what will be taught) will be highlighted by the experience and capabilities of the rulers and the courage and virtue of the citizens (14, p 42) In other words, history will hold a central place in the curriculum, particularly the history of the nation taught in such a manner as to glorify its past Probably a course in government would be included since the young students must be taught the laws of the state (14, pp 41-42) Play and games would also be organized for groups of children (13, p 99) Regardless of other subjects which might be offered, the form and sequence of the studies is an important responsibility of the lawmakers (13, p 98) Apparently, then, the curriculum would be divided into academic and non-academic components, with the former focusing on history and government, which are intended to inform students of their national heritage and current laws and leaders, to mould favourable attitudes toward their country, and to prompt action on its behalf.

Finally, the methods and teacher-student relationship in directly educating a citizen also appear to differ significantly from those suggested in *Emile* For example, whereas verbalization is de-emphasized in one instance, the famous warriors are brought in to 'preach courage' (14, p 42) in national education One would also assume that lecturing and discussion would hold a prominent place when the 'upright judges grown white in their office teach justice (14, p 42)' The examples of these and others would also be significant in the formation of the young Another contrast is seen in the freedom afforded Emile and the authority of discipline exercised in the direct rearing of a citizen In regard to the latter, children from an early age must become accustomed to discipline through strict enforcement of rules and laws (12, p 42, 13, p 99)

Although parents may arrange for part of the education of their children in the home, the state and its magistrates formulate educational laws and policies and superintend education Furthermore, the children must join their peers in public for games and exercises which are intended to cultivate
notions and attitudes of equality, fraternity, rivalry, and discipline. A spirit of community must be enhanced to insure the development of patriotism (14, pp 41-42).

Rousseau explicitly adverts in ‘Considerations on the government of Poland and on the Reformation of It Projected in April, 1772’ to the lack of details he is prescribing for this public education (13, p 100). However, he leaves no doubt that it is to be public education, that is, under the general auspices of the state and, more specifically, under public officials appointed by the highest political authority (14, p 41). On the public schools (which he calls ‘colleges’) rests the hope of the republic. The outcome sought is a united citizenry.

Without pursuing further details of Rousseau’s ‘education for citizenship,’ we will seek some philosophical principles (primarily in connection with the Social Contract) to substantiate this kind of education.

**Philosophical principles**

The philosophical fame achieved by Jean Jacques Rousseau has been achieved primarily through the Social Contract, his treatise in political philosophy. A brief clarification of the problems and purposes of that work will indicate in introductory fashion its pertinence to the educational principles analyzed under ‘Education for Citizenship.’

Whether to condemn the social order or attempt to justify it (2) – this is the broad problem raised in the Social Contract, and it is due to the fact that, while man is born free, he becomes enslaved. The first option, condemnation of society, is ruled out since ‘the social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights (12, p 6).’ Consequently, the justification of the legitimacy of the social order becomes a central concern of the Social Contract. The foundation of the social order is neither force (for that would violate free will) nor natural right (for the state of nature is distinct from the state of society), but agreement or convention and, therefore, some form of association. This human bond, to be stabilized in some form of contract, is not to be merely a means of protection, but the possibility of obeying oneself and remaining free in a social condition. One recognizes this, of course, as the perennial attempt to reconcile the individual good and the common good, authority and freedom, law and liberty, the fundamental problem approached and resolved (to Rousseau’s satisfaction, anyway) in the Social Contract.

The essence of the social compact is expressed by Rousseau as follows: ‘Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme
direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole (12, p 15). The result of this contract is the creation of a public person (or body politic) designated by various names — the State, the Sovereign, a Power, the people (citizens or subjects) — depending upon the connotation intended.

Three key terms arise in a further analysis of the social contract — sovereignty, general will, and freedom. The first signifies "nothing less than the exercise of the general will (12, p 22)." While every citizen has a particular will, it is his civic duty to conform his private will to the general will of the sovereign, of which he is a member. But, what is this general will? By what means is it known? How is it related to a particular will and the sum of particular wills? Answers to these questions provide some basis for grasping the signification of the third term, freedom.

Somewhat extensive attention will be devoted to the concept of the general will for two reasons — its importance in the Social Contract (2, p 91) and its significance for Rousseau's theory of national education (4, p xxiv). Perhaps it will be helpful in ascertaining what it is, to determine, first of all, what it is not. It is not a decision expressed in a majority vote of the assembly. For subjecting one's will to a majority vote could conduze to tyranny and intolerance. While the conclusion drawn from counting votes will not necessarily provide for the common good, the general will is infallible (2, pp 103-4, 9, pp 25-26). The distinction between the 'will of all' and the 'general will' must be maintained. The former is simply a sum of particular wills (9, p 25), the latter is the will of a universal subject, the sovereign people, and is always directed to the common good. Without further qualifications the two cannot be identified (regardless of the outcome of any vote taken to ascertain the sum of particular wills) (2, p 104).

Because the general will is 'the sum of the differences' (9, p 25) of the citizens voting independently, one means to the expression of that will is the obliteration of partial societies. Each citizen should think his own thoughts without relying upon those of other individuals and groups. If partial societies do exist, they should be as numerous as possible and equal. Only these precautions, says Rousseau, guarantee the proper enlightenment of the general will (9, pp 25-26). It follows that in a situation in which no partial associations exist in the society, or if those that do exist are as numerous as possible and are not unequal, and the people are voting in an enlightened manner, the general will and the will of all coincide, and a majority vote inevitably prescribes the common good (2, p 107). Therefore, there are
some circumstances in which 'counting votes' will not provide the general will, and there are other circumstances in which 'counting votes' will provide the general will, the basic criterion is the enlightenment of the people.

Perhaps it would not misrepresent Rousseau to suggest that the negation of all partial societies, and the existence of partial societies as numerous as possible and equal are fictions. Even assuming that such circumstances possibly could be attained, how might they be detected? We still find ourselves with the fundamental question, by what means can we ascertain the general will and, thus, the common good? Rousseau himself admits that 'Of itself the people wills always the good, but of itself it by no means always sees it. The general will is always in the right, but the judgment which guides it is not always enlightened, the public wills the good it does not see (9, p 34)'. In the same vein, Copleston comments as follows:

The individual, impelled fundamentally by self-love (not, we may recall, to be identified with egoism in a morally depreciative sense), naturally seeks his own good, though it does not necessarily follow that he has a clear idea of its true nature. The 'public person' which the social contract brings into existence also seeks inevitably its own good, the common good. But the people do not always understand where their true good lies. Hence they stand in need of enlightenment in order that the general will may be properly expressed (2, p 104).

The last of the three key ideas in our analysis of the social contract is freedom, which should be considered in the context of a comparison between the natural man and the civilized man, the contrast described in the Second Discourse. It appears that for the natural man political society is an evil, whereas we find the author claiming (in the Social Contract) that civilized man's nature is fulfilled in the social order. Is this a pure contradiction? Perhaps not. Even though the tone and emphasis are significantly varied, that can be explained partially in light of the fact that, in the Second Discourse, Rousseau has in mind the extant society, particularly France, while in the Social Contract he is reflecting upon the ideal society, the situation as it ought to be. Furthermore, along with extolling the benefits man acquires by means of the social contract, he laments that the abuses of his new circumstances degrade him. One also must keep in mind that, in the Second Discourse, Rousseau was concerned with the origins of inequality, and in the other work with the benefits attained through a societal environment. One of these benefits is the substitution of 'civil' and 'moral' liberty for 'natural' liberty.
It is noteworthy that Rousseau sees this transformation as beneficial (2, pp 99-100, 9, pp 18-19)

What are civil liberty, moral liberty, and natural liberty? The last is realized by man in the state of nature and signifies the unlimited right to everything which he attempts to obtain and succeeds in obtaining, it is limited only by the strength of the individual. Civil liberty refers to the proprietorship of all that one possesses (7, p 253) and is limited by the general will. Over and above natural liberty and civil liberty is moral liberty, acquired in the civil state, and apparently defined as 'obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves' (9, p 19). Therefore, natural liberty is lost by the social contract, but a higher kind of freedom is gained. Although some perverted forms of government may enslave human beings, that is accidental to the state, as such. The State, in its essence, is an inestimable benefit to man (2, p 101).

This brief summary does not represent an attempt to adequately review Rousseau's complete doctrine of the social contract and the difficulties therein, principles were selected and explained to serve as a possible basis for a philosophical substantiation of his view of education for citizenship.

**Philosophy of/and education**

The relationship between the philosophy and the education will be pursued again by distinguishing particular philosophical principles and seeking their respective educational implications. The first of three aspects of Rousseau's philosophical doctrine is the intrinsic legitimacy of the social order and the concomitant social nature of man. What does this mean for education? It appears to be directly related to portions, if not all, of the educational theory discussed in this section. For example, it serves to justify the central purpose of education — to form patriotic citizens — as well as the subsidiary goals, such as to inculcate knowledge of the past and present culture, to enhance respect for authority, to promote socialization at an early age, and to provoke the kind of behaviour befitting one who assumes responsibility for the common good.

Secondly, this philosophical view of man and society is not unrelated to the delegation of authority for education to the state, which has the care of the common good and will establish public schools to enrich social harmony and well-being. Thirdly, it has a bearing upon a curriculum which should include history and government taught by famous leaders and government officials, if possible and practical. Fourthly, the fact that man
is a social being is an inherent aspect of the demand for children to participate in exercises and games with other children in order to become imbued with the spirit of equality, fraternity, and community welfare. Undoubtedly, Rousseau’s acceptance of the reality of the social order and the social nature of man substantiates certain dimensions of his theory of national education.

The second of these three general philosophical principles concerns the view of moral liberty analyzed above. The role of law is highly significant in the definition, obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves. Although this principle cannot be separated from Rousseau’s theory of the general will, some observations on education can be made at this point. First of all, even though the law is prescribed to ourselves, it is a law and ought to be obeyed. Obedience to external authority might be commanded — Rousseau doesn’t say it like this — in light of the fact that the law (general will) is not readily known, and one would expect the wiser persons to be more aware of it than others, thereby clothing them (the wiser) with some authority. This attitude of respect for external authority, then, should be inculcated by the school. And since the wisest and noblest man must obey the law, self-discipline (or obedience to internal authority) is always prescribed. One could conclude that, for most persons, heeding external authority is helpful, if not essential, to the development of self-discipline, the latter is the end of the use of extrinsic authority. Secondly, in regard to the fact and reality of law and its necessity for becoming free, one sees in education the usefulness of acquainting students with exemplars among famous leaders of the past and present in order to excite emulation of those renowned patriots.

Finally, among these three principles is one of the most central as far as education is concerned directly. The general will has been described as the infallible means to the common good, and it is the source of the laws (7). The absolute need to confront and conform to the general will in order to be good and happy is an important point (2, p 90, 7, pp 259-260). However, as we have noted, even though the general will is infallible and necessarily desired by all, it is not, by that fact, known by all (9, p 34). Apparently, it can be known only with great difficulty (The concept itself was never clearly developed) (2, pp 105-106). This provides us, then, with the basic reason for the fundamental purpose of public education — to provoke awareness of the general will. The nature of that will even suggests that the process of seeking it be public. In the ‘Discourse on political economy,’ the general will is linked with public education through a consideration of virtue. Virtue is nothing other than the conformity of
particular wills to the general will (7, p 260, 2, p. 88) The reign of virtue, then, will depend, in part, upon the effectiveness of public education in securing this conformity (2, pp 88-89) This raises the age-old questions of whether virtue can be taught and, if so, how, but the need for public education, according to Rousseau, is clear.

The same qualifications made in concluding the philosophy of education for individualism in regard to the relationship between the specific philosophical and educational principles also govern these considerations. Again, all the principles may be attributed to the spirit, if not the actual terminology, of Rousseau, and there does appear to be a positive relationship between the philosophy and the education. Rousseau's 'education for citizenship' does have some basis in his philosophical teachings.

EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUALISM AND CITIZENSHIP? OR FOR CITIZENSHIP?

We are now prepared to reiterate and attempt to answer some of the basic problems posed at the outset of this paper. Can the two educational theories, education for individuality and education for citizenship, be reconciled? Has Rousseau reconciled them? Does he provide philosophical bases for each? If so, do these philosophical principles form a consistent pattern? Or has Rousseau formulated two distinct philosophies of education? Finally, what has Rousseau contributed to the 'modern mind'?

Regarding the third question, whether each of the two aspects of educational theory has a philosophical foundation in Rousseau's own doctrines, solid evidence in the affirmative has been provided. The consistency of the two patterns of philosophical thinking is a more difficult issue. However, that already has been discussed at some length. The corrupting tendencies of society contrasted with the inherent worth of the society and reality of man's social nature, and natural liberty compared to moral and civil liberty constitute large questions in the interpretation of Rousseau. As already indicated, the tone and emphasis of the various passages tend to create apparent contradictions. However, considering Rousseau's differing purposes, the context of his remarks, and the fact that he was confronting a richly variegated reality in controversial areas tends to modify the sharpness of the differences.

Has Rousseau really provided us with two separate theories of education? That question will be broached, first of all, by considering Emile alone. This famous treatise is largely responsible for Rousseau's reputation as the apostle of individualism in education. The strong emphasis in Emile upon
the upbringing of the individual, as such, is obvious, however, formation for social living is not overlooked (1, pp 181-182) The eighteenth-century philosopher of Romanticism does call Plato's Republic 'the finest treatise on education ever written (15, p 13)' and, in the same paragraph, bemoans the fact that communal education (in Plato's sense) does not and cannot exist in his own time because there are no longer any real fatherlands and real citizens (15, p 13) This makes quite intelligible Boyd's comment

The suggestion given in the opening sections of the Emile is that as things are the individualized education here set forth is the only natural education If society is unnatural, he tells us, we must choose between making a man and making a citizen we cannot make both There are, he says, two kinds of education, communal (or public) education, individual (or domestic) education in seeming opposition, but not really opposed Emile in France gets the individual training to make the best of his native powers, because citizenship in great nation states like France and England (according to Rousseau) involves the sacrifice of the natural individuality, which is everyone's birthright If Emile had been born in Geneva, or in a city state like Plato's Republic, or if the modern state could be reformed so that its citizens could preserve their original nature, it would be different Education would then make both man and citizen (1, p 170)

Furthermore, Emile was being prepared from infancy for entrance into society And he was introduced to Sophie and married her - not exactly an anti-social phenomenon Two conclusions appear Firstly, a system of national education would be natural and therefore desirable in a healthy society even for the author of Emile, perhaps only because of adverse conditions is the young boy kept away from social living at first And secondly, the final end of education is the formation of a social being (and a citizen, in some sense) despite the emphasis upon individuality

What other considerations provide for further reconciliation of the educational views expressed in Emile and in the 'minor writings' First of all, Rousseau's clientele must have influenced him

When he was discussing education with his patronesses or planning for the upbringing of Emile, private education was his theme when speculating about government, it was public education in the interests of the community as a whole In the latter case education is not treated by him as a separate issue but only in the context of some form of social organization (1, p 183)
Secondly, as already noted, in *Emile* private education for the individual was demanded in light of some degenerated (according to Rousseau) societies of Rousseau's direct experience, public education was portrayed when contemplating ideals (as he did when writing to Polish leaders on education). Thirdly, one might conjecture that teaching and living the predominance of the feelings over reason, as Rousseau did, makes more plausible the impassioned 'case' which he makes for the apparently contradictory educational tenets. Along these lines, it might be argued that he felt very strongly in both directions (toward individuality and citizenship) and tended to over-emphasize at one time and another what were, even for him, two sides of the truth. Finally, perhaps Rousseau has rendered a contribution by reflecting upon different aspects of a reality never viewed completely by any one person. The question he confronted was the educational dimension of the perennial philosophical issue of the individual good and the common good, being for oneself and being for others.

Although these considerations tone down the harshness of the seeming conflict, the question still remains, did Rousseau actually reconcile these divergencies for himself? On this point Boyd seems to say yes and no. He says 'yes' in the following terms:

Rousseau would certainly have maintained that there was no fundamental contradiction in his different proposals that what contradiction there is arises in the attempt to fit a child for a society which does not allow him to live his own proper life and that in a good society the difficulty would not exist (1, p 194).

He also says 'no'.

But in effect the two educational ideals never come together and never can come together. If the nation-states are as bad as Rousseau depicts them, the natural man of his making can never possibly become a citizen if his ideal-states created by the indoctrination of the young are as good as he thinks them, they have no room in them for real persons with powers of responsible choice (1, p 195).

Perhaps Rousseau really was not as absorbed with the problem as the rationalists to whom he was objecting would tend to be.

Finally, what does all this mean for us? Rousseau has wittingly or unwittingly contributed a dialectic which should inspire us to rethink...
the questions with which he has contended and the conclusions he has drawn. According to Boyd, there is truth in both assertions, namely, that education must form good individuals and good citizens, but Rousseau's mistake was in failing to transcend the either-or (1, p. 197).

The quest for the most appropriate kind of education for all persons, to render them more fully human individuals and citizens, must be continued. So, too, must the search for the philosophical groundwork of the education edifice.

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